{"id":6578,"date":"2026-04-23T16:13:58","date_gmt":"2026-04-23T14:13:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/esmfoundation.org\/?page_id=6578"},"modified":"2026-04-23T16:14:00","modified_gmt":"2026-04-23T14:14:00","slug":"csrms-and-switzerland","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/esmfoundation.org\/en\/csrms-and-switzerland\/","title":{"rendered":"CSRMs and Switzerland"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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Switzerland has barely any history in extracting or refining any of the raw materials classified as critical or strategic by the EU and other major economies (CSRMs) \u2013 including rare earth elements, cobalt, nickel, lithium, or copper. These materials enter Switzerland through imports, and often already embedded in semi-finished goods such as cables, magnets, batteries, semiconductors, or microchips. As a result, Switzerland is indirectly exposed to supply disruptions, price volatility, geopolitical shocks, and regulatory shifts within supplier countries. Its dependence on the EU \u2013 and the EU\u2019s dependence on concentrated external suppliers such as China \u2013 amplifies these vulnerabilities. Although deeply integrated into European value chains, Switzerland, as a non-EU member, has\u00a0no guaranteed access\u00a0to joint EU crisis-response tools such as coordinated emergency procurement.<\/h6>\n\n\n\n
Switzerland Lacks a Clear CSRM Strategy<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

Unlike many peer economies, Switzerland currently lacks a systematic national assessment of raw-material dependencies, as well as a coherent risk-mitigation strategy. However, rising geopolitical tensions \u2013 from intensifying trade conflicts to new export controls in China \u2013 have heightened Switzerland\u2019s awareness of raw material risks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In recent years the Federal Council has emphasized that supply security is, first and foremost, a responsibility of private companies, reflecting Switzerland\u2019s long-standing and successful market-oriented approach. This was highlighted again in the Report of the Federal Council<\/a> \u201cVersorgung der Schweizer Industrie mit mineralischen Rohstoffen f\u00fcr die Energiewende\u201d from December 2024, a response to the Postulate 20.3950<\/a> of National Councelor Elisabeth Schneider-Schneiter, \u201cVersorgungssicherheit. Metalle der seltenen Erden. Ressourcenstrategie\u201d.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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Who is Responsible?<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

The Federal Council stresses that supply security is primarily a private-sector responsibility. Companies are expected to manage risks through diversification, stockpiling, and business continuity management. This stance is consistent with Switzerland\u2019s market liberalism, but it generates several structural gaps: firms can manage company-specific risks, but not systemic or geopolitical ones, many Swiss firms are small and medium businesses that lack visibility into upstream concentration risks, and private actors cannot compensate for regulatory shocks (e.g., export controls). This market-first approach also distances Switzerland from international peers, who operate with hybrid systems that combine market responsibility with strategic coordination and government-backed foresight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Switzerland\u2019s governance of CSRMs is characterised by a fragmented institutional landscape, a strong reliance on market actors, and no clearly mandated lead authority. While the report by the Federal Council<\/a> outlines numerous activities across federal offices, it simultaneously reveals a lack of systematic coordination, missing strategic instruments, and unclear responsibilities for crisis preparedness. The result is a system that performs well under normal market conditions but is poorly equipped for geopolitical shocks, supply disruptions, or rapid technological shifts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The closest Switzerland has to a coordinating entity is the interdepartmental platform Rohstoffe<\/a>, established in 2013 by EDA, EFD and WBF. Its mandate is to \u201censure an integrated, coherent and forward-looking raw materials policy\u201d by facilitating information flows and dialogue across federal units. However, the platform is not an operational body and holds no mandate for risk assessment, market monitoring, crisis coordination, or strategic planning.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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<\/a>A Shift in Parliament: Rising Concern Over Raw Material Security<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
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In 2025, parliamentary activity around CSRMs increased significantly, touching on national security, trade policy, supply chain vulnerabilities, research, and geological assessments. Recent parliamentary initiatives include:<\/p>\n\n\n\n