Switzerland has barely any history in extracting or refining any of the raw materials classified as critical or strategic by the EU and other major economies (CSRMs) – including rare earth elements, cobalt, nickel, lithium, or copper. These materials enter Switzerland through imports, and often already embedded in semi-finished goods such as cables, magnets, batteries, semiconductors, or microchips. As a result, Switzerland is indirectly exposed to supply disruptions, price volatility, geopolitical shocks, and regulatory shifts within supplier countries. Its dependence on the EU – and the EU’s dependence on concentrated external suppliers such as China – amplifies these vulnerabilities. Although deeply integrated into European value chains, Switzerland, as a non-EU member, has no guaranteed access to joint EU crisis-response tools such as coordinated emergency procurement.
Switzerland Lacks a Clear CSRM Strategy
Unlike many peer economies, Switzerland currently lacks a systematic national assessment of raw-material dependencies, as well as a coherent risk-mitigation strategy. However, rising geopolitical tensions – from intensifying trade conflicts to new export controls in China – have heightened Switzerland’s awareness of raw material risks.
In recent years the Federal Council has emphasized that supply security is, first and foremost, a responsibility of private companies, reflecting Switzerland’s long-standing and successful market-oriented approach. This was highlighted again in the Report of the Federal Council “Versorgung der Schweizer Industrie mit mineralischen Rohstoffen für die Energiewende” from December 2024, a response to the Postulate 20.3950 of National Councelor Elisabeth Schneider-Schneiter, “Versorgungssicherheit. Metalle der seltenen Erden. Ressourcenstrategie”.
Who is Responsible?
The Federal Council stresses that supply security is primarily a private-sector responsibility. Companies are expected to manage risks through diversification, stockpiling, and business continuity management. This stance is consistent with Switzerland’s market liberalism, but it generates several structural gaps: firms can manage company-specific risks, but not systemic or geopolitical ones, many Swiss firms are small and medium businesses that lack visibility into upstream concentration risks, and private actors cannot compensate for regulatory shocks (e.g., export controls). This market-first approach also distances Switzerland from international peers, who operate with hybrid systems that combine market responsibility with strategic coordination and government-backed foresight.
Switzerland’s governance of CSRMs is characterised by a fragmented institutional landscape, a strong reliance on market actors, and no clearly mandated lead authority. While the report by the Federal Council outlines numerous activities across federal offices, it simultaneously reveals a lack of systematic coordination, missing strategic instruments, and unclear responsibilities for crisis preparedness. The result is a system that performs well under normal market conditions but is poorly equipped for geopolitical shocks, supply disruptions, or rapid technological shifts.
The closest Switzerland has to a coordinating entity is the interdepartmental platform Rohstoffe, established in 2013 by EDA, EFD and WBF. Its mandate is to “ensure an integrated, coherent and forward-looking raw materials policy” by facilitating information flows and dialogue across federal units. However, the platform is not an operational body and holds no mandate for risk assessment, market monitoring, crisis coordination, or strategic planning.
A Shift in Parliament: Rising Concern Over Raw Material Security
In 2025, parliamentary activity around CSRMs increased significantly, touching on national security, trade policy, supply chain vulnerabilities, research, and geological assessments. Recent parliamentary initiatives include:
- Interpellation 25.3188 – Kritische Rohstoffe für die nationale Sicherheit und Verteidigung
- Motion 25.3947 – Versorgungssicherheit mit strategischen Rohstoffen und Halbfabrikaten in Freihandelsabkommen
- Interpellation 25.4059 – Les terres rares. Un risque stratégique ?
- Interpellation 25.4420 – Verankerung des Themas kritische Rohstoffe in Politik, Wissenschaft und Ausbildung
- Postulat 25.4419 – Stärkung der Versorgungssicherheit durch Identifikation kritischer Rohstoffe und Halbfabrikate
- Interpellation 25.4421 – Charakterisierung von Rohstoff-Lagerstätten von nationalem Interesse
While most of these initiatives were ultimately rejected by the Federal Council, their very emergence – and the breadth of issues they address – signals a clear rise in political attention. The increased parliamentary activity reflects a growing awareness that Switzerland’s exposure to raw materials-related risks is becoming more visible, more strategic, and more urgent. Even without immediate legislative changes, the debates underline that critical raw materials security is moving firmly onto the political agenda and will likely remain a topic of national relevance in the years ahead.
Sectors at Risk
Switzerland currently lacks comprehensive, country-specific data that allows quantifying the exposure of domestic industries. Drawing on international evidence and Switzerland’s industrial structure, the sectors most likely to face CSRM risks include:
mechanical, electrical, and metalworking industries
robotics, automation, and sensor technology
the energy and mobility sectors
security-relevant fields such as defence and critical infrastructure
the pharmaceutical sector
Across all these sectors, risks often stem less from direct imports of raw materials but from the procurement of advanced components that incorporate critical metals – for example permanent magnets containing neodymium and dysprosium, battery cells dependent on graphite, cobalt or lithium precursors, semiconductor devices using gallium, germanium or hafnium, and high-precision mechanical components containing nickel, titanium or specialty alloys. Switzerland’s dependency is therefore embodied in the international production of technologically sophisticated sub-components whose supply chains are strongly geographically concentrated.
Switzerland’s Advantages
Despite its vulnerabilities, Switzerland has several structural strengths that can cushion the impact of supply shocks:
Low-volume, high-value industry structure: Low overall material consumption in industry, concentrated in specialised, high-value niches;
Strong purchasing power and excellent creditworthiness, supporting access to scarce materials even in tight markets;
A world-class research and innovation ecosystem, enabling advanced materials science, substitution research, and high-efficiency technologies.
These advantages cannot eliminate risks but provide Switzerland with greater strategic flexibility compared with countries with large, resource-intensive industries.